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THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY TO
DISMISS CRIMINAL CHARGES AFTER
SEVERAL HUNG JURIES: A PROPOSED





The State of Arizona charged John Henry Knapp with first
degree murder in the house-fire death of his two minor daughters.
The first trial in 1973 ended in a hung jury with seven of the twelve
jurors voting in favor of conviction.2 At his second trial six months
later, Knapp was convicted and spent over a decade on death
row. In 1987, nearly fifteen years after the first trial, the state
court granted Knapp's postconviction petition for relief on the
grounds that advances in fire science had raised serious questions
as to the validity of the arson theory advanced by the prosecution;
namely, that the fire had necessarily been caused by flammable
liquid rather than accidentally caused by the children playing with
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1. See ROGER PARLOFF, TRIPLE JEOPARDY: A STORY OF LAW AT ITS BEST-
AND WORST (1996).
2. See id. at 393.
3. See State v. Knapp, 562 P.2d 704,709 (Ariz. 1977).
4. See PARLOFF, supra note 1, at 395.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
matches.5 As part of his basis for ordering a new trial, the judge
specifically found that the newly discovered evidence "would
probably change the verdict upon a retrial of this case.",
6
At the third trial the jury once again hung, seven to five in fa-
vor of conviction.7 On the eve of a fourth retrial, the case was dis-
posed of by plea bargain.8
During the preparation for the fourth trial, the defense team
examined whether the court could dismiss the case on the grounds
that the prosecution had failed three times without any fault on the
part of the defense to obtain an unimpeachable conviction.9 The
team moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that three attempts
to convict were enough. 0 As stated in the caption of the motion:
"Enough Is Enough."'
In 1966 approximately five percent of the cases that pro-
ceeded to trial ended in deadlocked juries.12 That percentage has
probably increased since then.1 3 The occurrence of a small per-
5. See Knapp v. Martone, 823 P.2d 685, 686 (Ariz. 1992); see also PARLOFF, su-
pra note 1, at 233-34.
6. PARLOFF, supra note 1, at 233-34.
7. See id. at 393.
8. See id. at 401-03 (discussing the circumstances surrounding the plea agree-
ment).
9. See Motion to Dismiss: Enough Is Enough, Brief for Defendant John Henry
Knapp, State v. Knapp, No. CR 90-08222 (Super. Ct. of Ariz. for the County of
Maricopa submitted Oct. 1, 1992) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss]. The judge who
dismissed the jury on the third retrial opined that it was unlikely a reasonable jury
could reach a verdict on the evidence presented. See id. at 16 (citing State v. Knapp,
RT, Dec. 5, 1991, at 4-5). So, too, did members of the jury when questioned. See id.
at 14.
10. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9. Alternatively, Michael Berch moved to
prevent the prosecution from improving its chances for a conviction by altering its
theory of the case to accommodate positions inconsistent with those it took in the
three previous trials. The court denied each motion.
11. See id
12. See Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury: Notes for an Eng-
lish Controversy, 48 CH. B. REc. 195, 200 (1967) (stating that juries deadlock in
5.6% of cases in states that require unanimity).
13. Many celebrated cases have ended in deadlock. In March 1996 brothers Lyle
and Erik Menendez were convicted of the first degree murder of their parents in the
first retrial following a hung jury. See Ann W. O'Neill & Bob Pool, Menendez Jurors
Sure of Their Decisions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1996, at B1. Byron De La Beckwith
was tried and convicted several years ago for civil rights slayings in Mississippi in the
1960s. See Beckwith v. State, 615 So. 2d 1134 (Miss. 1992). The first jury hung. See
id. at 1135.
Hung juries are not limited to celebrity cases. A Los Angeles County Public
Defender document indicates that 429 cases hung from July 1, 1994 to February 16,
1996. See Los Angeles County Public Defender Analysis of Database of Hung Juries
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centage of deadlocked juries, however, is not necessarily a symp-
tom that something is wrong with the criminal justice system. In-
stead, it may demonstrate that the system truly works. There will
always be cases in which the requisite number of jurors simply
cannot agree on a verdict, even if they focused solely on the evi-
dence presented and the instructions given.
State v. Knapp raised and this Article examines a separate is-
sue: How many times may the state retry a defendant whom it has
been unable to convict? At what point should the court simply re-
fuse to hear the case and declare that an impasse has been
reached? These questions implicate several legal, political, and
ethical issues. This Article concludes that double jeopardy is not
the source of the courts' power to dismiss a prosecution after sev-
eral hung juries. Another principle that may limit the prosecutor's
right to repeated attempts to obtain a conviction is the courts' in-
herent power, also referred to as the courts' supervisory role, in
the administration of justice.14 Several courts have already recog-
Since 7/1/94 [hereinafter Hung Jury Database]; Los Angeles County Public De-
fender's Office Data Base Totals [hereinafter Base Totals]. Of these, 259 were felo-
nies. That number represents approximately 5.4% of all felony trials. See Fredrick
M. Muir, Supervisors Warned on '3 Strikes,' L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1994, at B1 (Los
Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti stated that the number of felony jury trials
has remained steady at about 2400 per year). One hundred twenty-nine felony cases
were set for retrial; of the 48 felonies that have been tried, 37 resulted in verdicts: 30
were guilty and 7 were not guilty. See Hung Jury Database, supra. Eleven, or nearly
23%, hung. See id. Of these, three were dismissed, five were plea bargained, and
three were set for a third trial. See id.
14. We have interchanged the terms "inherent" and "supervisory" powers, as
many courts do. Terminology, however, should not confound the important distinc-
tion regarding the source of the power. In true supervisory cases the source may, in
part, stem from congressional acts and court rules that are subject to congressional
overrule. Thus in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), the first case to re-
fer to "supervisory powers," the Court asserted that affirming the conviction would
"stultify" congressional policies. See id. at 345. McNabb has been overturned by
statute. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501
(1968). Inherent powers, on the other hand, may include powers that inhere in the
judicial office and that may not be affected by congressional overrule. See United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). The Supreme Court has also devel-
oped important bodies of procedural law without referring to the source of the
power at all. For example, ten years before McNabb, the Court decided in the ab-
sence of any congressional act that evidentiary questions should be formulated "in
accordance with present day standards of wisdom and justice rather than in accor-
dance with some outworn and antiquated rule of the past." Funk v. United States,
290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933). The entrapment defense, which developed in the 1920s, is
yet another example of the courts' exercise of inherent powers. See Kelly M. Hayes,
Note, Criminal Law-Florida Adopts a Dual Approach to Entrapment-Cruz v.
State, 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1985), 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1171 (1986). The recogni-
tion and exercise of inherent or supervisory powers contain an element of protecting
January 1997]
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nized this power to bar repeated prosecutions. 5 Others have de-
nied it. 6 The battle still rages with no clear victor. As such, this
Article turns to an analysis of the principles that underlie and the
significant cases that explore the nature of the courts' inherent
power.
Part II of this Article examines traditional notions of double
jeopardy and concludes that double jeopardy is not the source of
the courts' power to dismiss cases. Part III explores other poten-
tial sources of this judicial power. The judiciary bears the ultimate
responsibility to oversee the administration of justice. To function
properly as an independent branch of government, the judiciary
should be able, in the absence of legislative direction to the con-
trary, to abort prosecutions under the circumstances mentioned in
this Article. This power stems from common law principles re-
garding the inherent power or supervisory role17 of the judiciary.
After addressing the principle of separation of powers, this Article
concludes that the principle does not militate against, but in fact
supports, the forthright recognition of the courts' inherent power
to dismiss prosecutions.
Part IV reviews the factors that the court should appropriately
consider in exercising its discretion in a particular case. We pro-
pose that the prudential exercise of discretion must be "guided by
considerations of fundamental fairness, as well as the judiciary's
responsibility for the proper overall administration of the criminal
justice system."' 8
Part V examines the rarely discussed question whether the
dismissal should be with or without prejudice. The final part of
the judicial system's interest in preserving judicial integrity, an interest distinct from
protecting the rights of the litigants.
This Article asserts that the federal courts possess the inherent power to
dismiss prosecutions after several abortive attempts. The power inheres in the judi-
cial office and does not contravene separation of powers principles. Indeed, it fur-
thers the goals of separation of powers by recognizing that the judiciary has the
power to preserve judicial integrity and the rights of litigants. We concede that the
power is subject to congressional override under the Necessary and Proper Clause to
the extent that the dismissal is not based upon constitutional principles.
15. See Annotation, Propriety of Court's Dismissing Indictment or Prosecution
Because of Failure of Jury to Agree After Successive Trials, 4 A.L.R.4th 1274 (1981)
[hereinafter Failure of Jury to Agree].
16. See id. At times it is difficult to discern from the opinions whether the refusal
is predicated on a lack of power or on discretionary grounds.
17. In this context the terms are often interchanged. See supra note 14 and ac-
companying text (distinguishing courts' supervisory powers from inherent powers).
18. State v. Abbati, 493 A.2d 513, 518 (N.J. 1985).
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this Article proposes a rule that should be considered by the Advi-
sory Committee to the United States Supreme Court and its coun-
terparts in the several states. It builds upon the areas in which
courts have already recognized their inherent powers to control
litigation. We extrapolate from these decisions a guiding principle
to govern the disallowance of repeated prosecutions. Despite
misgivings of several courts that the power to bar reprosecution af-
ter several hung juries would encroach upon the prerogatives of
the executive,19 the better reasoned view militates against whole-
sale abdication of the right to bar reprosecution. Indeed separa-
tion of powers principles would seem to favor a power reposed in
the courts to declare that "Enough Is Enough" and that the pre-
ferred route is to promulgate a rule.
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT REQUIRE DISMISSAL OF
PROSECUTION AFTER ONE OR MORE HUNG JURIES
In 1824 Justice Story wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court ill
United States v. Perez2 that a defendant could be retried following
a hung jury.21 Although the decision alludes to neither the Fifth
Amendment nor the Double Jeopardy Clause,23 it has been con-
19. The judge in the third retrial of Knapp expressed concern about this issue.
See also United States v. Gonsalves, 691 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 464 U.S. 806 (1983) (supervisory powers doctrine com-
plements separation of powers principle); cf. People v. Baker, 335 N.Y.S.2d 487, 496
(1972) (stating that "there is no law or precedent that gives the court the power to
absolve [the defendants] from the serious charges that stand unresolved and unad-
judicated"); PARLOFF, supra note 1, at 395 (discussing executive policy choices).
20. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). Interestingly, United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 32 (1812), a seminal case that recognized the inherent power of the courts
to preserve their own existence and to promote justice, had already been decided.
See id. at 33. The Perez Court did not refer to Hudson or to the inherent or implied
powers doctrine, See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). Indeed,
it was not until McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), that the inherent
power doctrine embraced matters other than housekeeping and the observance of
order in the proceedings. See infra note 93 and accompanying text (distinguishing
power to dismiss from power to employ mere housekeeping rules).
21. See Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580.
22. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). It is assumed for
purposes of discussion that, apart from fairness concerns embodied in the Due Proc-
ess Clause, the defendant has no specific constitutional right to terminate proceed-
ings. Specific guarantees would, of course, inform the court's decision to terminate
criminal proceedings even at the initial stages. See United States v. Armstrong, 116
S. Ct. 1480 (1996) (examining selective prosecution based on race); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (challenging selective prosecution based on race); see
also infra note 30 (discussing due process in the context of the inherent powers doc-
trine).
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sistently followed in later cases squarely presenting the question
whether retrial following a hung jury violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause.24 Since the decision in Perez, much energy has been ex-
pended in analyzing whether the Double Jeopardy Clause is the
source of the courts' power to restrict reprosecutions after one or
more hung juries.2 Despite modem Supreme Court pronounce-
ments clearly holding that jeopardy attaches at the time the jury is
impaneled and sworn,H the Court recently reaffirmed the Perez
ruling.27 Chances are slim that the Court will alter its position.
Although several scholarly works and judicial opinions criti-
cize Perez, this Article concludes that Perez should be followed
not only in the federal system, but also in state systems interpret-
ing similar state double jeopardy provisions.2 The opposite ap-
It is assumed that after repeated attempts to obtain a conviction there may
come a time when due process would bar still another attempt. Under these circum-
stances the Supremacy Clause binds state tribunals to respect the fairness principles
embodied in the notions of due process. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1.6, at 17 (5th ed. 1995). The public may doubt
whether, if a fourth trial finally results in a guilty verdict after the jury has hung three
times, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard has truly been met. This Article
concludes that there is a point at which the courts may, pursuant to their inherent
powers and free of constitutional compulsion, bar reprosecution.
23. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). Perhaps the deci-
sion in Perez did not mention the Double Jeopardy Clause because in that era jeop-
ardy did not attach until a verdict had been rendered.
24. See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 323 (1984) (citing United
States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 579 (1824), for the proposition that "failure of [a]
jury to agree on a verdict [constitutes] 'manifest necessity' [permitting] a trial judge
to terminate the first trial"); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 678-79 (1982)
(holding that a defendant's successful motion for a mistrial bars a second trial if
prosecutorial or judicial misconduct provoked the motion).
25. For a collection of the judicial opinions regarding this subject, see Failure of
Jury to Agree, supra note 15.
26. See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28,35-36 (1978).
27. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 672.
28. See, e.g., Janet E. Findlater, Retrial After a Hung Jury: The Double Jeopardy
Problem, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 701 (1981); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mis-
trials, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 449, 451 (1977); see also Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d
810, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (stating that "repeated trials subject a defendant to serious
hardship"); Preston v. Blackledge, 332 F. Supp. 681, 688 (E.D.N.C. 1971) (holding
that "to try the petitioners five times is far beyond the allowed exceptions set forth in
Perez, and also exceeds the limitations on the right to retry an accused subsequently
set forth by our Supreme Court"). These cases were decided before Richardson. See
Crist, 437 U.S. at 34 n.10 (stating "to cast ... new light on Perez at this late date
would be of academic interest only").
29. States are free to interpret their state constitutions differently. Careful at-
tention must be given to the precise constitutional language. For example, the Mis-
sissippi Constitution provides that before a person shall be considered to have been
once in jeopardy, so as to bar another prosecution, there must be an actual acquittal
[Vol. 30:535
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proach-that is a blanket rule forbidding retrial after, for example,
one hung jury-is problematic for several reasons:
1. It would impose a tremendous hardship on the government
and society in those circumstances in which one or two intransi-
gent jurors hold out;30
2. It would encourage the defense with few or no attendant
risks to try the case in such a manner as to invite a hung jury;
3. It would make judges reluctant to find the "manifest ne-
cessity" required for granting a mistrial;
4. It might induce more states to permit convictions on less
than unanimous verdicts31 and would present the Supreme Court
an additional opportunity to consider adopting a rule permitting
less than unanimous verdicts in federal prosecutions.32
Examining the purposes underlying the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not lead to a different conclusion. The clause serves
or conviction on the merits. See JOHN W. WINKLE III, THE Mississippi STATE
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 34 (Reference Guides to the State Constitu-
tions of the United States No. 12, 1993). Whether a Mississippi court would be free
to use its inherent powers to prevent reprosecutions after several hung juries is cer-
tainly more problematic than in states not having a similar constitutional provision.
See id.
30. Unanimous verdicts are no longer required in some jurisdictions. See Charles
E. Moylan, Jr. & John Sonsteng, Constitutional Constraints on Proving
"Whodunnit?", 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 171, 195 (1990). The Supreme Court has
upheld a conviction of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rendered on a vote as dispa-
rate as 9-3. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972); see also Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972) (noting that juries may convict or acquit by votes of
10-2 or 11-1). Thus, the mere fact that a jury is hung by a few recalcitrant jurors does
not mean that the prosecution has not proven guilt by a standard that would have
satisfied constitutional requirements.
Double jeopardy should not be implicated even by jury splits so large that
the jury verdict would not have been constitutionally supportable. Also, if double
jeopardy does not militate against a retrial after one hung jury, it would be difficult
to find a principled justification for using double jeopardy as the springboard from
which to dismiss successive prosecutions-perhaps due process, which is essentially a
fairness standard, but not double jeopardy. Therefore, we do not rely on double
jeopardy as the basis from which the court's power to prevent a retrial springs.
Two other reasons lead to the preference that the power be inherent. First,
the inherent power doctrine presents no federalism concerns and therefore is prefer-
able to finding a constitutional violation that requires the bar. Second, due process
does not take into account the systemic interests of the judiciary, while the inherent
power doctrine does.
31. See State v. Belgard, 410 So. 2d 720 (La. 1982); State v. Gann, 463 P.2d 570
(Or. 1969).
32. Thus far, the Supreme Court has consistently required the unanimous vote of
twelve jurors in federal prosecutions. See Jeremy Osher, Comment, Jury Unanimity
in California: Should It Stay or Should It Go?, 29 Loy.,L.A. L. REv. 1319, 1328
(1996).
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primarily to protect the defendant's interest in having his or her
fate determined by the first impaneled jury and to prevent the
State from acquiring a second chance to convict.3 The defendant's
supposed interest in having the first impaneled jury determine his
or her fate-the crux of those decisions barring retrial where the
prosecutor deliberately injects error into the proceedings to goad
the defendant into moving for a mistrial-does not apply in the
deadlocked jury situation because the jury has not determined the
defendant's fate. Assuming that the jury's inability to decide the
case has occurred through no fault of the prosecution, the Perez
ruling is perfectly sound. 5
III. THE JUDICIARY POSSESSES THE INHERENT POWER, SUBJECT
TO CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPOSED STATUTORY AND RULE MAKING
LIMITATIONS, TO DETER REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN A
VERDICT
The mere fact that double jeopardy does not bar successive
prosecutions does not mean that the court must permit, under all
33. As the United States Supreme Court noted:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (emphasis added).
For a further discussion of this idea and the related doctrine of manifest ne-
cessity, see infra note 35.
34. See, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 667 (1982).
35. Perez specifically held that a deadlocked jury presents a case of manifest ne-
cessity. See Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580. Unless a defendant consents to a re-
trial, in order to invoke the manifest necessity principle and allow reprosecution, the
trial judge must take all reasonable steps to assure a jury verdict. See Winston v.
Moore, 452 U.S. 944 (1981). Only when these measures fail to produce a verdict will
discharging the jury not raise double jeopardy concerns. See id. at 946. The death of
a trial judge during the proceedings presents a clear case of manifest necessity. See
United States v. Holley, 986 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Illinois v. Somer-
ville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) (stating that a judge's determination to declare mistrial
based on defective indictment presents a case of manifest necessity where defective
indictment would have been grounds to overturn the conviction on appeal); Wade v.
Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (finding that judicial officers are needed in the battle-
field to assist the invasion); United States v. Jaramillo, 745 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1984)
(stating that an indictment of a judge during trial constituted manifest necessity war-
ranting declaration of mistrial). But see Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734
(1963) (stating that a retrial is prohibited where jury dismissed because of absence of
prosecutor's witness).
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circumstances, retrials after one or more hung juries. Fifty years
ago in McNabb v. United States,36 the United States Supreme Court
declared its "supervisory authority over the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts." 37 This power formed an in-
dependent basis for the Court's authority to exclude a confession
induced by an unreasonable delay in bringing the defendant before
a magistrate. The Court specifically concluded that "[j]udicial
supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized
standards of procedure and evidence," even when the evidentiary
and procedural rules have the result of thwarting or aborting
prosecutions.
Although McNabb discussed only the Supreme Court's su-
pervisory power over lower federal courts, lower federal courts
have also quite logically embraced the doctrine.4 One commenta-
tor has stated that the "principal impact [of the supervisory powers
doctrine] has been felt in federal criminal cases in which the fed-
eral courts have employed [the doctrine] to establish rules of evi-
dence and judicial procedure and to devise sanctions for miscon-
duct by prosecutors and government investigators.",41 McNabb,
other Supreme Court cases 42 and an analysis of several lower court
opinions addressing the precise issue43 should sufficiently dispel
any notion that the federal courts lack the power to bar repeated
attempts to obtain a conviction. And while the principle use of su-
pervisory power has ordinarily involved cases in which there has
been prosecutorial misconduct or violations of statutes and rules, it
is not so restricted.44
36. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
37. Id. at 341.
38. See id. at 341-42.
39. Id. at 340.
40. See Sara S. Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM.
L. REv. 1433, 1433-34 (1984).
41. Id. at 1434.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (recognizing the
Court's supervisory power to exclude tainted evidence); Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657 (1957) (dismissing a criminal action when prosecution fails to comply with
order).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Gunter, 546 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1976) (finding that
court had the power to act, but that the breaking point had not been reached);
United States v. Ingram, 412 F. Supp. 384 (D.D.C. 1976).
44. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); United States v. Hudson,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
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Although generalizations about state court systems are always
somewhat dangerous, few state systems are encumbered with the
limitations that bind the federal judiciary. The text and history of
Article III of the United States Constitution, the early years of the
relationship between the federal courts and the legislative branch,
and the recognition by the Court of inherent limitations upon the
judiciary have cast the federal courts in a posture quite different
from that of their state counterparts. Thus many state systems, as
a general rule, would recognize their inherent power to abort
prosecutions.45
The doctrine this Article discusses poses neither obvious fed-
eralism nor significant separation of powers concerns. Since fed-
eral constitutional law does not compel the inherent powers doc-
trine,46 state courts are free to accept or reject it. Furthermore, it is
assumed that federal and state legislatures are free to overrule
prospectively, or expand or limit decisions to abort prosecution af-
ter several hung juries. In fact, these court decisions, unlike those
based upon constitutional adjudication, invite dialogue with other
branches of government. But a decision initially based on supervi-
sory power47 may presage a future decision based upon the Consti-
tution. Such a course would raise federalism and separation of
powers concerns.
Judicial precedents involving the inherent or supervisory
power of the courts in the federal and state systems invite the
conclusion that courts need not automatically defer to a prosecu-
tor's decision to retry a defendant.
A. Analysis of McNabb
McNabb v. United States,4 generally regarded as the United
States Supreme Court's first supervisory power decision,49 involved
the defendants' prosecution for murdering a federal officer."
45. See Annotation, What Constitutes "Manifest Necessity" for State Prosecutor's
Dismissal of Action, Allowing Subsequent Trial Despite Jeopardy's Having Attached,
14 A.L.RAth 1014 (1982).
46. See Beale, supra note 40, at 1434. The Supremacy Clause does not operate
unless the proposition of law is based upon the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 22, § 1.6, at 17. A principle of
law governing the court system and emanating from inherent power binds only
courts within the system that has adopted it. See Beale, supra note 40, at 1434.
47. See Beale, supra note 40, at 1451.
48. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
49. See Beale, supra note 40, at 1435.
50. See McNabb, 318 U.S. at 333. The defendants sold whiskey on which federal
[Vol. 30:535
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Following several sessions of intense questioning, the defendants
made incriminating statements, which were subsequently admitted
at the murder trial."' The defendants were convicted of second de-
gree murder, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld
the convictions on appeal.52
The Supreme Court sua sponte raised the question whether
the trial court properly admitted the defendants' incriminating
statements.5 3 Focusing on various federal and state statutes requir-
ing that arrested persons be taken promptly before a judicial offi-
cer,5 4 the Court found that Congress intended to outlaw "third de-
gree" and "secret interrogation[s]." 55 The Court concluded that
the arresting officers' conduct was incompatible with the duties of
officers of the government and tended to undermine the integrity
of criminal proceedings."6 Delaying the defendants' arraignment
until officers had obtained confessions flagrantly violated the fed-
eral statutory requirements, and therefore the defendants' state-
ments were inadmissible.57 The Court found that allowing a con-
viction to rest on evidence secured in such a manner "would
stultify the policy which Congress had enacted into law."58 Al-
though Congress had not explicitly forbidden the use of such evi-
dence5 9 the Court opined that the admission of unlawfully secured
evidence would make "the courts themselves accomplices in willful
disobedience of the law."'
taxes had not been paid. See id. During a raid of the illegal sale, an officer of the
Alcohol Tax Unit of the Internal Revenue Service was shot and killed. See id. at
334. Federal officers arrested several members of the McNabb family for the shoot-
ing and for their involvement in the sale of the untaxed whiskey. See id. Following
the arrest, officers held three of the defendants in a detention room for 14 hours. See
id. at 334-35. The defendants were not permitted to see relatives or friends, and they
had no attorney. See id. at 335. At least six officers at a time questioned the defen-
dants, singly and together, for two days. See id. at 336.
51. See id. at 338 n.5.
52. See id. at 333.
53. See id. at 339-45.
54. See id. at 342.
55. See id. at 344.
56. See id. at 341-42.
57. See id. at 345.
58. Id.
59. See id; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) (stating the time within which a suspect
must be brought for initial appearance before a magistrate judge); United States v.
Monroe, 397 F. Supp. 726, 732 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that the rule prohibiting un-
reasonable pretrial delay was meant to prevent confessions from being made as a re-
sult of the coercive effect of police custody which is prolonged and isolated).
60. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 345.
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The Court found that its power to review federal court con-
victions is "not confined to ascertainment of Constitutional valid-
ity."'" From its inception the Court has exercised supervisory
authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts by formulating rules of evidence to be applied in federal
criminal prosecutions: 2 "Judicial supervision of the administration
of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of estab-
lishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evi-
dence," which are not satisfied merely by observing minimal safe-
guards for securing trial. 3 From this observation sprang the
recognition of the Court's supervisory power.
B. Analysis of Post-McNabb Cases
Since its McNabb decision the Supreme Court has used the
supervisory power doctrine in various contexts. Some decisions
apply supervisory power to help ensure accuracZ and fairness and
to preserve the integrity of the criminal process. For example, in
Ballard v. United States5 the Court used its supervisory power to
protect the integrity of the judicial system. The Court prohibited
exclusion of women from juries on the grounds that exclusion
causes "injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the
community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the
processes of our courts. 6 6 Focusing on considerations of fairness
to a criminal defendant, the Court in Jencks v. United States67 ex-
ercised its supervisory power to require the government to pro-
duce for the defendant's inspection all reports made by two gov-
ernment witnesses regarding activities to which the witnesses
61. Id. at 340.
62. See id. at 341.
63. Id at 340.
64. See Beale, supra note 40, at 1449-50; see also United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225, 231 (1975) (supervisory power justified to preserve integrity of judicial sys-
tem and public confidence); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957)
(supervisory power justified by fundamental requirements of fairness); Mesarosh v.
United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956) (supervisory authority used "to see that the wa-
ters of justice are not polluted").
65. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
66. Id. at 195.
67. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). Although this opinion does not expressly refer to su-
pervisory power, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have identified Jencks as a
supervisory power decision. See, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362
(1959).
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testified at trial.6 The Court rejected the prevailing rule, which
required a preliminary showing of inconsistency, as "incompatible
with our standards for the administration of criminal justice in the
federal courts."69
The Supreme Court also has used its supervisory power to
remedy violations of individual rights and to impose sanctions
where extrajudicial government conduct has violated the Consti-
tution, federal statutes, or procedural rules.70  For example, in
Elkins v. United State' the Court invoked its supervisory power
over the administration of criminal justice to preserve the consti-
tutional principles underlying the Fourth Amendment's search and
seizure requirements. Considerations of reason, experience, and
judicial integrity72 persuaded the Court to overrule the "silver plat-
ter" doctrine, which allowed fruits of an unreasonable state search
or seizure to be admitted in a federal criminal trial, if federal offi-
cers were not involved in the search or seizure.73 The Court rea-
soned that federal courts should not be "accomplices in the willful
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold."74
Just three years before Elkins, the Court had applied the
McNabb reasoning to a pre-arraignment confession given by a de-
fendant who was not taken before a magistrate within a reasonable
time, in violation of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.75 To safeguard individual rights and preserve the poli-
cies underlying Rule 5(a), the Court held the confession inadmis-
sible.76
Recently the Supreme Court used its supervisory power as a
basis for sanctioning attorney misconduct. In Chambers v. Nasco,
Inc.,7 a civil case, the Court held that federal courts may, in the
exercise of their supervisory power, award attorneys' fees as a
68. See Jencks, 353 U.S. at 668.
69. Id.
70. See Beale, supra note 40, at 1451, 1455.
71. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
72. See id. at 222.
73. See id. at 206-08.
74. Id. at 223.
75. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 452-53 (1957). If officers make a
warrantless arrest, they must "take the arrested person without unnecessary delay
before the nearest available commissioner or other nearby officer empowered to
commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States." Id. at
451-52; FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
76. See Mallory, 354 U.S. at 449-56.
77. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
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sanction for bad-faith conduct.8 The Court stated that its inherent
power extends to a full range of litigation abuses and exists to fill
in the interstices created by statutes and rules.79
Although the inherent power principle has usually involved
cases of misconduct by the parties or a vindication of statutory
principles, the doctrine is not so limited. For example, in Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert"0 the Court affirmed the lower court's decision to
dismiss a case on the grounds of forum non conveniens, a doctrine
which, at that time, did not have constitutional or statutory roots.8'
The dismissal was based on principles of fairness to the defendant
and the interests of the public in the effective administration of
justice.s2 Indeed, the Court has recognized the salutary purposes
underlying the doctrine: to prevent abuses, oppression, and injus-
tice.Y In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhineharte the Court cited with ap-
proval Judge Friendly's observation that "[w]hether or not the
Rule itself authorizes [a particular protective order],... we have
no question as to the court's jurisdiction to do this under the in-
herent 'equitable powers of courts of law over their own process,
to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices."'85
Despite its seeming breadth, the inherent power doctrine does
contain significant built-in limitations. In United States v. Mit-
chell, ' for example, the Court refused to suppress the confession
of an accused who was illegally detained for eight days before be-
ing taken before a magistrate.Y The Court recognized that
McNabb involved an exercise of the Court's power to formulate
appropriate policies for federal criminal trials;"8 however, the
Court found that supervisory power should not be used "as a pu-
nitive measure against unrelated wrongdoing by the police"89 or as
78. See id. at 45-47.
79. See id. at 46.
80. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
81. See id. at 509, 512.
82. See id. at 508-12.
83. See id. at 504, 508.
84. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
85. Id. at 35 (alteration in original) (citing International Prods. Corp. . Koons,
325 F.2d 403,407-08 (2d Cir. 1963)).
86. 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
87. See id at 70-71. The Court distinguished the facts from those in McNabb by
noting that in Mitchell the accused confessed immediately, rather than after a pro-
longed illegal detention. See id. at 70.
88. See id. at 68.
89. Id. at 70.
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an "indirect mode of disciplining misconduct."9
In later cases the Court restricted lower courts' use of supervi-
sory power9' and required that lower courts comply with all limita-
tions set forth in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 92
The foregoing cases support the proposition that a federal
court may properly dismiss a prosecution when doing so will serve
the ends of justice and the effective administration of the court's
business.93 After all, management of the court's docket is the ju-
90. Id. at 71.
91. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 45-47 (1992); United States v.
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 (1983); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-37
(1980).
92. See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia i'. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988)
(stating that supervisory power does not permit the court to circumvent the harm-
less-error inquiry required by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure). But see Chambers, 501 U.S. at 32 (stating that the court's inherent power is
not displaced by statute and rules).
Not surprisingly, the Court has specifically limited the reach of supervisory
power in Fourth Amendment cases. In United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980),
the Court found that "the interest in deterring illegal searches does not justify" ex-
cluding tainted evidence if the evidence was "seized unlawfully from a third party
not before the Court." Id. at 735. The Court reasoned that supervisory power does
not extend so far as to give the judiciary "discretionary power to disregard the con-
sidered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing." Id. at 737.
The Court has also stressed the importance of sparingly exercising the inher-
ent power to refuse material evidence. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440
(1963). In Lopez the Court found that where federal officials have not engaged in
manifestly improper conduct, the use of supervisory power is unwarranted. See id.
Unless the manner in which the officers obtain the evidence compels a court to ex-
clude it, the court must admit all relevant competent evidence. See id.
93. This Article considers the power to dismiss after several hung juries as arising
from the inherent power of the court. Another possibility, however, is ostensibly
based upon rule rather than common law. Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides two avenues of local rulemaking. First, the district court by ma-
jority vote and in accordance with the process outlined in the Rule may make any
rule governing practice not inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 57. Second, "[i]n all cases not provided for by rule, the
district judges and magistrate judges may regulate their practice in any manner not
inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in which they act." Id. The
question becomes whether the power to dismiss after several hung juries can be
predicated on the Rule. We think not. Although the "district courts have broad
rule-making powers both by reason of the inherent nature of the judicial process, ex-
statute, and pursuant to powers statutorily vested in the courts," United States v.
Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 652 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc), there are common sense limita-
tions. In Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641 (1960), the Court invalidated a local rule al-
lowing discovery in admiralty cases at a time when the admiralty rules were silent on
the issue. See id. at 651-52. The Court stated that more mature consideration was
needed for adoption of a rule relating to discovery that was of such significance to




diciary's responsibility. Cases that clog the calendar and have little
chance of being resolved through a verdict should be considered
likely candidates for dismissal.9
The subjects covered by the district court under Rule 57 may generally be
classified as housekeeping rules such as:
terms of court, hours of court, regulation of conduct of attorneys, regulation
of the calendar, continuances, filing and service of motions and other pa-
pers, methods of impaneling a jury .... stipulations, preparation and service
of subpoenas, order of opening and closing arguments, requests to charge,
regulation of court reporters, [conduct of sentencing hearing] and regula-
tion of bail bonds and bondsmen.
8C JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 1 57.02 (2d ed. 1996).
Clearly the power to dismiss is qualitatively different and cannot be classified as
housekeeping. Although other decisions upholding Rule 57 orders such as allowing
questioning by jurors and inspection of premises owned by a nongovernment party
rise slightly above housekeeping rules, they still do not rise to the significance of a
rule allowing dismissal of a case after several hung juries.
Although it would be comforting to find that Rule 57 gives courts such a
power, thus aborting the separation of powers problems that inhere in the inherent
powers doctrine, such an approach seems disingenuous and simplistic.
94. Lower federal courts have used supervisory power in a wide variety of situa-
tions. However, unlike the Supreme Court, which often anticipates subsequent con-
stitutional rulings, many lower federal courts use their supervisory powers to impose
conditions or reach results that the Supreme Court already declared were not re-
quired by the Constitution. For example, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 507 F.2d
963 (3d Cir. 1975) (Schofield 1), and In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3d
Cir. 1973) (Schofield 1), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals used its supervisory
power to impose a preliminary showing requirement on federal prosecutors before it
would enforce a grand jury subpoena. See Schofield II, 507 F.2d at 966; Schofield I,
486 F.2d at 93. The Third Circuit issued the Schofield rulings despite the Supreme
Court's decisions that the Fourth Amendment does not require a preliminary show-
ing of probable cause. See Schofield II, 507 F.2d at 968 (citing United States v. Dion-
isio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (involving voice exemplars)); see also United States v. Mara,
410 U.S. 19 (1973) (regarding handwriting exemplars). This end-run approach
should be rejected.
In the past federal courts had often used supervisory power to protect the
grand jury process through methods such as the dismissal of grand jury indictments.
See United States v. DiBernardo, 552 F. Supp. 1315, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd in
part and vacated in part on other grounds, 880 F.2d 1216 (11th Cir. 1989). For ex-
ample, in DiBernardo the Florida District Court exercised its supervisory power to
dismiss indictments for distribution of sexually explicit films and magazines. See id.
at 1328. Because the FBI agent who posed as a pornographer in the investigation
had a propensity to lie, the court found an abuse of the grand jury process and de-
clared the grand jury proceedings tainted. See id. at 1327.
Courts have also dismissed grand jury indictments to punish government mis-
conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Vetere, 663 F. Supp. 381, 386-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(dismissing indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct in presenting evidence to
grand jury); United States v. Allen, 539 F. Supp. 296, 319-20 (C.D. Cal. 1982)
(dismissing indictment because defendant's prosecution would be manifestly unjust);
see also United States v. Owen, 580 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing but not
ordering dismissal of indictment to punish governmental misconduct).
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36
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C. Analysis of State Court Decisions Recognizing the Inherent
Power and Supervisory Role Doctrines
As suggested, state courts have recognized and employed in-
herent and supervisory powers in a wide variety of civil and crimi-
nal matters. 5 Like federal courts, state courts may exercise these
powers to ensure the overall integrity of the judicial system96 as
(1992), casts doubt on the continuing validity of these cases. However, some federal
courts have limited the drastic dismissal remedy to situations in which the govern-
ment has seriously, flagrantly, or repeatedly abused the grand jury process. See, e.g.,
United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1535 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that a
dismissal should lie "only for flagrant or repeated abuses [that] are outrageous or
shock the conscience"); United States v. Beeler, 500 F. Supp. 426,428 (D. Nev. 1980)
(asserting that improprieties must be serious and flagrant to justify dismissing a
grand jury indictment).
Lower courts also have exercised supervisory power in different ways to con-
trol the conduct of attorneys or punish prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., United
States v. Ottley, 439 F. Supp. 587, 591-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (dismissing count based on
misuse of prosecutor's charging discretion); United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 389,
397 (D.S.D. 1974) (dismissing case based on prosecutor's misconduct during discov-
ery and trial).
In addition to protecting judicial integrity and controlling attorney conduct,
lower federal courts have used supervisory power to address evidentiary issues such
as recognizing a priest-penitent privilege, see Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275,
277 (D.C. Cir. 1958), and creating special evidentiary rules for prosecutions of con-
sensual sodomy cases, see Kelly v. United States, 194 F.2d 150, 153-55 (D.C. Cir.
1952).
Lower courts have also used supervisory power to formulate judicial proce-
dure in the district courts. For example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals created a
five-step procedure that a court must follow before it may dismiss a complaint sua
sponte. See Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109, 1112 (6th Cir. 1983). The Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals formulated a procedure for closing the courtroom and re-
straining publication of potentially prejudicial material during the trial. See United
States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 7-8 (3d Cir. 1974). A district court set forth a two-part
test for determining when a court may exercise its inherent power to sanction a non-
party. See Helmac Prods. Corp. v. Roth (Plastics) Corp., 150 F.R.D. 563, 568 (E.D.
Mich. 1993). A Ninth Circuit panel approved the use of inherent power to issue an
order protecting a witness. See Wheeler v. United States, 640 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir.
1981). Furthermore, directly on point are several lower court decisions recognizing
the inherent power of the court to bar reprosecution after several hung juries. See
United States v. Gtinter, 546 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Ingram, 412
F. Supp. 384 (D.D.C. 1976). Clearly, the inherent power doctrine is a potent source
of power for a lower court to override a prosecutor's decision to retry a criminal de-
fendant after several hung juries.
95. See supra notes 65-94 and accompanying text. The effect of the use of su-
pervisory power is different in civil and criminal cases because civil cases affect only
the litigating parties whereas criminal cases affect society as a whole. See State v.
Braunsdorf, 297 N.W.2d 808, 816 (Wis. 1980).
96. See, e.g., Pena v. District Ct. of Second Jud. Dist., 681 P.2d 953, 956 (Colo.
1984) (inherent power consists of all powers reasonably required to protect dignity,
independence, and integrity of court); Clark v. Austin, 101 S.W.2d 977, 988 (Mo.
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well as the efficiency of the court.97 Some state courts have held
expansively that the inherent power is a general power of the court
to protect itself As a result, it includes the power to do every-
thing necessary to carry out the underlying purpose for which the
court was created.99
Some state courts reason that a court's inherent power derives
from the separation of powers doctrine.O In other states the
power comes directly from state constitutional provisions that
specifically grant supervisory authority to the state courts.101
Where supervisory power stems from an express constitutional
grant, state courts have recognized the power as a distinct and
separate grant of jurisdiction, independent of any other power
1937) (inherent power is that which is necessary to the existence and functioning of
the courts in the exercise of powers granted to them).
97. See, e.g., Gebhart v. Ernest DiSabatino & Sons, Inc., 264 A.2d 157, 159 (Del.
1970); In re Courtroom, 134 N.W. 490,495 (Wis. 1912).
98. See Clark, 101 S.W.2d at 988 (stating that inherent power is "essentially a
protective power").
99. See, e.g., Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 29 N.E.2d 405,
408 (Ind. 1940); In re Bruen, 172 P. 1152, 1153 (Wash. 1918).
State courts have used inherent and supervisory power to resolve many is-
sues. See, e.g., In re Complex Asbestos Litig., 232 Cal. App. 3d 572, 586, 283 Cal.
Rptr. 732, 739 (1991) (controlling the conduct of attorneys before the court and dis-
qualifying attorneys where necessary); In re Judges of Cedar Rapids Mun. Ct., 130
N.W.2d 553, 555 (Iowa 1964) (stating that both sides have a right to be heard before
a dismissal and remedying oppressive and improper use of the power of the lower
courts and procedures that disregard individual rights); Ex parte Sturm, 136 A. 312,
314 (Md. 1927) (controlling photography in court); In re Patton, 519 P.2d 288, 291
(N.M. 1974) (regulating the practice of law); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate,
274 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1971) (determining the funding needs of the judicial branch);
Pettit v. Board of Tax Appeals, 538 P.2d 501, 504 (Wash. 1975) (reviewing actions of
public officials); Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354 v. Mead Educ. Ass'n, 534 P.2d 561, 563
(Wash. 1975) (punishing for contempt); State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe, 169 P.2d
706, 710 (Wash. 1946) (compelling witness attendance and production of evidence);
State ex reL Syverson v. Foster, 146 P. 169, 171 (Wash. 1915) (granting bail). Some
states rely on the courts' inherent power to control their calendar and effect the or-
derly administration of justice. But see Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 25 N.Y.2d 237
(Ct. App. 1969) (limiting the court's inherent power to control its own calendar when
the court acts in contradiction to legislative rules). Others focus on the English
common law origins of dismissal for lack of prosecution. See, e.g., Gebhart v. Ernest
DiSabatino & Sons, Inc., 264 A.2d 157 (Del. 1970).
100. See, e.g., In re Doe, 407 S.E.2d 798, 803 (N.C. 1991) ("By virtue of being one
of three, separate, coordinate branches of the government, the courts have the in-
herent power and authority to do what is reasonably necessary for the proper ad-
ministration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction."); In re E.C., 387 N.W.2d
72, 76 (Wis. 1986).
101. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (giving the New Mexico Supreme Court "a
superintending control over all inferior courts").
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granted to the court.'02 But even where state constitutions do not
expressly grant supervisory powers, state courts may nonetheless
find that they have such powers. These courts assert that state
constitutional provisions regarding the judicial branch are really
limitations on, rather than grants of, jurisdiction."3 Thus, all pow-
ers not expressly withheld from the state courts in the constitution
are retained by the state courts, including the inherent supervisory
power.104
There are, however, ill-defined limitations on this power.
Some state courts view supervisory power as an extraordinary
power-to be used only in situations in which no other form of re-
lief is available and a gross injustice would result if the court did
not act.10 5 Other courts have found that the exercise of inherent
power must be related to the orderly, efficient exercise of the
court's jurisdiction and must neither extend the jurisdiction of the
court nor abridge or negate individual constitutional rights.
0 6
In sum, most state courts do recognize, subject to constitu-
tional and statutory limitations, an inherent power in the judiciary
to control court dockets and administer justice. Courts have the
power to abort reprosecution after several hung juries.
IV. THE COURT SHOULD BAR PROSECUTION IF IT IS UNLIKELY
THAT THE JURY WILL RENDER A VERDICT
The principal justification for aborting repeated attempts to
convict should be the probability that the jury will not be able to
render a verdict. But the power to dismiss prosecutions is also
supported by subsidiary reasons, such as the desire to prevent
anxiety to and harassment of the defendant, to dispense justice,
and to balance the interests of society against fairness to defen-
dants. In examining these justifications, the court should consider
102. See, e.g., State ex rel Shores v. District Ct. of Second Jud. Dist., 71 P. 159, 160
(Mont. 1903).
103. See, e.g., Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 1144, 1147
(Idaho 1983).
104. See id.
105. See, e.g., State ex rel. Middleton v. District Ct. of Third Jud. Dist., 278 P. 122
(Mont. 1929); State ex rel. DuBois v. Ryan, 514 P.2d 851 (N.M. 1973); State ex rel.
O'Sullivan v. District Ct. of Tenth Jud. Dist., 175 P.2d 763, 764-65 (Mont. 1946).
106. See, e.g., In re J.S., 404 N.W.2d 79, 83 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
107. But see Hoskins v. Commonwealth, 154 S.W. 919 (Ky. Ct. App. 1913), which
may be read as denying a power in the courts to bar repeated prosecution. As noted
earlier, Mississippi may be another such aberrant jurisdiction. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
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several factors, including the following:..8
1. the difference, if any, in the evidence likely to be admitted
at the retrial;
2. the number of previous deadlocked juries;
3. the balance in the number of jurors voting for acquittal or
conviction;
4. the reason for the jury disagreement;
5. the fairness of the previous trials;
6. the seriousness of the underlying charges;
7. the character of the defendant;
8. the likelihood of repeated offenses;
9. the passage of time since the offense and the retrial;
10. the effect of further prosecution on the justice system's
ability to handle other cases.
The above factors should be considered in light of (1) the
fairness to the defendant in having to bear the expense and emo-
tional upheaval of another trial when considered against the
chance that a verdict will or will not be reached; (2) the costs to
society in retrying these cases, at times to the detriment of other
litigants; and (3) the public perception of the justice system.
The court must be aware of the appearance to the public even
if a verdict is rendered. Public confidence in the jury system,
108. Many of the cases discuss, usually in a cursory fashion, one or more of the
factors that a court should consider in the exercise of its discretion. See Failure of
Jury to Agree, supra note 15. For a somewhat more extended discussion of several of
these factors and the impact of the doctrine on separation of powers concerns, see
State v. Abbati, 493 A.2d 513, 521 (N.J. 1985).
In State v. Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 712 (Haw. 1982), the court stated:
But speaking generally, the "inherent power of the court is the power to
protect itself; the power to administer justice whether any previous form of
remedy has been granted or not; the power to promulgate rules for its
practice; and the power to provide process where none exists."
That aspect of the judicial power which seeks to "administer justice" is
properly invoked when a trial court sua sponte dismisses an indictment with
prejudice following the declaration of one or more mistrials because of
genuinely deadlocked juries, even though the defendant's constitutional
rights are not yet implicated. In so stating, we are cognizant of the defer-
ence to be accorded the prosecuting attorney with regard 
to criminal pro-
ceedings, but such deference is not without bounds. As stated elsewhere:
Society has a strong interest in punishing criminal conduct. But society
also has an interest in protecting the integrity of the judicial process
and in ensuring fairness to defendants in judicial proceedings. Where
those fundamental interests are threatened, the "discretion" of the
prosecutor must be subject to the power and responsibility of the court.
Id. (citations omitted).
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tenuous at best in the past decade,"9 should not be further under-
mined. This public perception concern should properly be a factor
in the court's determination whether to abort prosecution.
A. Differences in Evidence
Differing evidence is the most critical factor when evaluating
the likelihood of reaching a verdict. If the court believes that the
evidence at the retrial is likely to be different-whether because of
newly discovered evidence, a change in tactics, or the court's rul-
ings on the admission of evidence-then it may not be confident
that a retrial will be futile. On the other hand, in many cases the
evidence will be virtually the same on retrial."0 When the evi-
dence is similar, a court may more confidently predict the likely
outcome of a retrial, especially after the court reviews the reasons
for the previous hung juries.
B. Number of Deadlocked Juries
The number of prior deadlocked juries should inform the ex-
ercise of the court's discretion to bar reprosecution. One hung
jury should not trigger the bar."' At the other extreme, three
deadlocked juries should presumptively mandate a bar order,
subject to an examination of the other factors mentioned in this
Article.
Many cases present situations in which courts have reversed
109. See Cathleen Decker, The Simpson Legacy: Faith in Justice System Drops,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at S2; Philip Hager, Confidence in Court System Dips, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1992, at A3; Carla Rivera, Majority Say Denny Verdicts Too Lenient,
L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1993, at Al.
110. The trial judge in Knapp noted that the evidence on retrial would be the
same, that he would adhere to every evidentiary ruling previously made, and that a
verdict in the fourth retrial was unlikely. Cf PARLOFF, supra note 1, at 394-96
(indicating that despite the fact that the fourth trial would have expert testimony, the
jury will still hang in the fourth trial since the prior trials hung even though expert
testimony was presented). Nevertheless he refused to dismiss. Cf. id. at 394-402
(stating that the case resolution came from a no contest plea and not a dismissal).
Although parties often change tactics after hung juries so as to avoid weak points
and accentuate strong ones, a total change of direction amounting to adopting in-
consistent positions does raise serious fairness concerns. See Jacobs v. Scott, 115 S.
Ct. 711, 711-12 (1995) (Stevens, J., and Ginsberg, J., dissenting from denial of stay of
execution); see also supra note 10, infra note 142 and accompanying texts (discussing
inconsistent positions).
111. It is assumed that the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal was
properly denied. Otherwise, the case should have been dismissed and a judgment of
acquittal entered as a matter of law.
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convictions on appeal, followed or preceded by hung juries. In
these cases the grounds of a court's reversal of a conviction must
be considered.11  For example, assume a verdict of conviction is
overturned on appeal only for a technical point having nothing to
do with the sufficiency or weight of the evidence, such as improper
venue. In that situation the court should not consider the reversal
as equivalent to a hung jury. Indeed, the conviction itself dispels a
finding that a jury could not render a verdict.
113
The second retrial of the Knapp case presents an interesting
variation. The defense argued that the overturning of the convic-
tion in the second trial was tantamount to a hung jury.14 In over-
turning that conviction twelve years later, the state court relied
upon newly discovered scientific evidence that "would 'probably'
change a jury's verdict.' '1 5 In light of the judge's observation, the
second trial certainly could not be considered as establishing that a
reasonable jury could agree on the verdict. It was, for all practical
purposes, the equivalent of a hung jury.
C. Breakdown of Jurors' Votes in Previous Deliberations
Closely tied to the number of hung juries as a factor in reach-
ing a decision on retrial is the numeric breakdown of the jurors'
votes. Consider the following situations: A single juror holdout at
trial in favor of acquittal should not prompt judicial intervention."6
In fact, in some states such a verdict could constitutionally suffice
112. See State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. 1978) (refusing to allow fourth re-
trial after three deadlocked juries).
113. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Court noted in passing without
approval or disapproval that Manning, another defendant in a different case and the
main prosecuting witness in Barker's trial, had been tried four times previously be-
fore being finally convicted in the fifth trial of murdering one victim and in the sixth
trial of murdering another. See id. at 516-17. The four previous trials ended in two
hung juries and two convictions. See id. The two convictions were reversed on ap-
peal. See iL
114. See State v. Knapp, 562 P.2d 704, 709 (Ariz. 1977); see also PARLOFF, supra
note 1, at 161 (noting that the defense argued that the first deadlocked jury consti-
tuted double jeopardy).
115. See PARLOFF, supra note 1, at 241-42. "In Arizona, to grant a defendant's
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a judge must find that
the new evidence would probably have changed the verdict." Id. at 233-34.
116. Interestingly, the Los Angeles statistics reflect that of the 21 cases retried af-
ter hanging 11-1 in favor of guilt, 5 defendants were found innocent, 10 were found
guilty, and 6 juries hung again. See Base Totals, supra note 13. Of the 29 cases end-
ing in 11-1 splits in favor of innocence, 22 were dismissed by the prosecutor, 6 were
set for retrial, and 2 were actually retried with one ending in a conviction and the
other in a verdict of not guilty. See Base Totals, supra note 13.
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as a judgment of conviction.1 17 Nor should an isolated minority of
jurors clinging to idiosyncratic beliefs despite clear majority de-
terminations for conviction bar a second trial. On the other hand,
should the minority juror holdouts in two or more hung juries be in
favor of conviction, a bar order may serve the interests of justice
and efficiency since it takes unanimity, or near unanimity, to con-
vict."" Finally, where three hung juries are equally or nearly
equally divided, a bar order seems appropriate, again subject to
consideration of the other factors discussed in this Article.119
D. Qualitative Nature of the Previous Proceedings
The court should examine the quality and nature of the earlier
proceedings in determining whether the government should be al-
lowed to retry a defendant. In making the inquiry the court should
consider several subissues: Was the evidence fully and fairly pre-
sented? Did the jury seem attentive? Did the hung jury result
from a reason that, in the opinion of the court, would not recur in
the retrial? Did the court take sufficient steps in the previous pro-
ceedings to prevent the hung jury?
1 2
In other contexts courts consider whether previous proceed-
ings were fully and fairly conducted. In habeas corpus proceed-
ings, for example, the fairness issue predominates. Moreover,
117. See Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Requirement of Jury Unanimity as to Mode
of Committing Crime Under Statute Setting Forth the Various Modes by Which Of-
fense may be Committed, 75 A.L.R.4th 91 (1990); see also supra notes 30-32 and ac-
companying text.
118. In this situation the defendant may prefer to be vindicated by a jury verdict
of acquittal. The court should consider the defendant's interest in obtaining such a
result as a factor, although not a controlling one. In fact, if the judge grants the bar
order to retrial sua sponte over the defendant's objection, it must be entered with
prejudice. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 678-79 (1982); see also United
States v. Join, 400 U.S. 470, 485 n.12 (1971) (stating that "where a defendant's mis-
trial motion is necessitated by judicial or prosecutorial impropriety designed to avoid
an acquittal, reprosecution might well be barred").
119. See supra Part IV.
120. Such steps might entail not only an examination of the number of days of
deadlock, but also the additional steps taken in the trial, including further instruc-
tions to the jury, to break the impasse. In Knapp, for example, the trial court took
the unprecedented step of asking the jurors to specifically identify the issues that di-
vided them. See PARLOFF, supra note 1, at 389-91. "It amounted to a laundry list of
every major issue in the case...." Id. at 391. The court then ordered additional
closing arguments by counsel on these issues. See id. at 389-90. Notwithstanding
these innovative procedures, the third jury hung. See id. at 393.
121. See McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568, 2574 (1994); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505
U.S. 333, 351 (1992).
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lower courts are required under Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore'1 to
consider the question in the case of offensive use of collateral es-
toppel by strangers to the previous litigation.'23 Because courts are
familiar with examining the fairness of prior proceedings in other
contexts, superimposition of this factor should cause little diffi-
culty.
E. Substantive Nature of Juror Disagreement
In most cases the court can only surmise the nature of the jury
disagreement. 24 At other times, either through the court's con-
temporaneous probing of the jury or through juror affidavits after
the discharge of the jury, the court can identify the nature of the
disagreement. In deciding whether to bar further retrials, the
court should consider the number of issues that divide the jury and
the nature of the issues. Some issues may be more correctable on
retrial than others.1 2 The court will have to make an informed es-
timate of how likely it is that these divisions will recur in a subse-
quent trial.
F. Jury Composition
A probe into jury composition may factor into whether a
judge should allow a retrial. Although in other settings such an in-
quiry might implicate equal protection concerns, this examination
should be allowed in determining the likelihood that another jury
will reach a verdict. Judges can discern whether the jury was com-
posed of exceptionally qualified persons. The court can revisit the
voir dire and the steps taken to assure a fair jury. It should con-
122. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
123. See id. at 330-31; see also United States v. Johnson, 55 F.3d 976, 978 (4th Cir.
1995) (taking notice that a judge in a prior proceeding demonstrated an abundance
of fairness).
124. Just as a general verdict ordinarily masks the specific grounds of a decision, a
hung jury normally hides the areas of disagreement among jurors. Perhaps a rule
should be adopted that would give the lower court specific authority to probe the
reasons for the jury deadlock. This probe would assist the advocates in presenting
the case upon retrial. In addition, this probe would assist the court in determining
whether it should find manifest necessity and declare a mistrial and whether there
should be a retrial. See discussion infra note 126 and Part VI (discussing proposed
Rule).
125. Some issues are not likely to ever be resolved. For example, in Knapp ques-
tioning of the jury revealed that the jurors were divided on every significant issue in
the case. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 14; PARLOFF, supra note 1, at 391;
supra note 120.
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sider any reason indicating that another jury would be different,
more attentive, or more fair. In a highly complex case, the court
might even consider the educational background of the jurors. It
would assist the retrial determination if judges recorded their ob-
servations regarding the attentiveness and conscientiousness of the
jury.
126
G. Seriousness of Charges
As expected, the vast majority of the cases that have exam-
ined whether to bar retrial have involved capital crimes or other
serious felonies.lV Although the prosecutor undoubtedly consid-
ered the nature of the charges in determining whether to retry the
defendant, the interests of justice and efficiency nevertheless im-
pose on the court an independent obligation to consider the ques-
tion. Political and other extraneous considerations may motivate a
prosecutor-considerations divorced from the merits of the case or
the systemic impact of a retrial on the disposition of other cases.'2
H. Speedy Trial Concerns
In some cases the passage of time may have prejudiced the
proceedings. Evidence may be lost or destroyed. This loss of evi-
dence and its impact on the jury may support an inference that a
reasonable jury could not reach a verdict. Of course, it may also
have the effect of rendering a verdict more likely. In the latter
case the courts have explored the constitutional ramifications of
permitting another trial.'29
126. The proposed Rule requires the court after the second hung jury to record
the reasons for the deadlock. See discussion infra Part VI (discussing proposed
Rule).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Ingram, 412 F. Supp. 384,385 (D.D.C. 1976) (bank
robbery); State v. Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 708 (Haw. 1982) (reckless manslaughter
by beating); State v. Abbati, 493 A.2d 513, 515 (N.J. 1985) (kidnapping, sexual as-
sault); State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1978) (first degree murder).
128. Knapp provides an example of extrinsic concerns that might motivate a
prosecutor but would not affect the court: Michael Berch heard rumors that the
prosecutor's decision to reprosecute Knapp the third time was motivated, in part, by
the fact that the complex case drained funds that would otherwise have been avail-
able for other indigent defendants. In addition, although not at issue in the Knapp
case, prosecutorial vendettas have been known to occur. See Bruce Fein, Time to
Rein in the Prosecution: New Rules are Necessary to Limit Potential Abuse of Power,
A.B.A. J., July 1994, at 96.
129. Cf. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970) (holding that delayed trial denied
accused's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial).
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L Miscellany
Other factors that reasonably bear on whether further retrials
should be allowed may also be considered. Courts may wish to
consider such factors as harassment, the defendant's record, the
likelihood of repeated offenses, other punishments imposed such
as civil suits and loss of licenses, drain of public capital and re-
sources, and staffing at the prosecutor's or defender's office 3'
V. THE ORDER BARRING REPROSECUTION SHOULD ORDINARILY
ISSUE WITH PREJUDICE
The few cases that have barred reprosecution on inherent ju-
dicial power grounds have apparently done so with prejudice. 3'
Under these circumstances the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
United States Constitution bars reprosecution for the same of-
fense.1 32 Whether the order should ordinarily issue with or without
130. Several states have statutes permitting the court on its own motion to abort
prosecutions in the interests of justice. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (Deering
1992); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 170.40 (McKinney 1993). The statutes are, of course, not
limited to the hung jury situation, but the factors upon which they rely may be rele-
vant to determining whether to abort further retrials because of hung juries. New
York, for example, lists the following ten factors:
(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense;
(b) the extent of harm caused by the offense;
(c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial;
(d) the history, character and condition of the defendant;
(e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel in
the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant;
(f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence
authorized for the offense;
(g) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the community;
(h) the impact of a dismissal [on] the confidence of the public in the crimi-
nal justice system;
(i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the complainant or
victim with respect to the motion;
(j) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction would
serve no useful purpose.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 170.40.
131. See United States v. Ingram, 412 F. Supp. 384 (D.D.C. 1976); State v. Witt,
572 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. 1978).
132. See U.S. CONST. amend V. The Constitution does not prevent an appeal by
the government of these orders. For appeal of orders dismissing for failure of prose-
cution, see United States v. Huntley, 976 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1992) and United States v.
Kitzman, 520 F.2d 1400 (8th Cir. 1975). In criminal cases double jeopardy concerns
may trump a court's wish to render the dismissal without prejudice. See Downum v.
United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
Orders dismissing civil cases with prejudice bar additional transactionally re-
lated claims under the doctrine of res judicata. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL
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prejudice depends upon the reasons for the bar. The proper
starting point in determining whether to dismiss with prejudice is
to examine the rule or statute authorizing the dismissal.1 3  Unless
the rule or statute limits the factors to be considered, the court
may properly review the law in related areas.
Rule 5.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
a federal magistrate judge to dismiss a complaint and discharge the
defendant if "there is no probable cause to believe that an offense
has been committed or that the defendant committed it."' ' A
dismissal under Rule 5.1(b) is without prejudice: "[D]ischarge of
the defendant [does] not preclude the government from instituting
a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.'
135
Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure basi-
cally restates the court's inherent power to dismiss a case for want
PROCEDURE § 11.8 (4th ed. 1992). A rule directly on point would ordinarily govern
res judicata consequences. For example, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, all orders involuntarily
dismissing cases should be granted with prejudice, except dismissals based upon ju-
risdictional grounds. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41. It is important to note the implications
of Rule 41. For example, some orders are, by their nature, without prejudice-those
dismissing cases for improper venue or lack of jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIv. P.
41(b); see also Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961) (stating that under Rule
41(b), dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not prohibit subsequent proceedings);
Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc. v. Noto, 548 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(holding that dismissal for improper venue does not bar refiling of the same claim).
Other orders are presumptively with prejudice unless the court otherwise orders. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 41; see also Bowles v. Biberman Bros., Inc., 152 F.2d 700 (3d Cir.
1945) (holding that an unspecified dismissal operates as a dismissal with prejudice).
Note, too, that the Rule provides that the plaintiffs failure to prosecute may serve as
the basis of an order dismissing the case, with or without prejudice. See FED. R. CIv.
P. 41; see also Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Propriety of Dismissal for Failure of
Prosecution Under Rule 41(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 A.L.R. FED.
488, 502 (1974) (stating that some courts have inquired into the propriety of dis-
missals for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b)). In civil cases orders entered with-
out prejudice are presumptively valid and not subject to constitutional scrutiny. See
9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
2364 (2d ed. 1995). For further discussion on this issue, see Annotation, Construc-
tion, as to Terms and Conditions, of Rule or Statute Providing for Voluntary Dis-
missal Without Prejudice Upon such Terms and Conditions as Court Deems Proper,
21 A.L.R.2d 627 (1952).
133. For an examination of the proposed Rule on the effect of bar orders, see in-
fra Part V.
134. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(b).
135. Id_; see also United States v. Gogarty, 533 F.2d 93, 95 (2d Cir. 1976)
(discharge of defendant before indictment or dismissal of indictment is without
prejudice to further prosecution); United States v. Kysar, 459 F.2d 422, 423 (10th Cir.
1972) (prosecution on subsequent grand jury indictment not barred by earlier dis-
missal).
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of prosecution."' The Rule provides that if the prosecution unnec-
essarily delays "in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing
an information against a defendant... [or] in bringing a defendant
to trial, the court may dismiss the indictment, information, or
complaint." '137 Rule 48(b) does not mandate dismissal unless the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been de-
nied, 38 in which case further prosecution for the same offense is
barred.
13 9
The court has the discretion to enter the order with or without
prejudice unless overridden *by legislative provision or constitu-
tional mandate. The court must examine the reasons for the bar
before deciding whether to render it with or without prejudice.
The court should accompany the order of dismissal with specific
findings. For example, if the judge believes it improbable that a
verdict could be rendered at retrial, that judge should state reasons
with specificity. Ordinarily these reasons support a dismissal with
prejudice. There is no discretion, however, where the court orders
the dismissal sua sponte over the objection of the defendant. In
that case the bar must be with prejudice.1'4
The court may issue an order without prejudice in those lim-
ited circumstances in which the prosecution can establish to the
court's satisfaction that it might be able to present a stronger case
136. See FED. R. CGRIM. P. 48(b) advisory committee's note.
137. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b).
138. See United States v. Hill, 622 F.2d 900, 908 (5th Cir. 1980).
139. See 3A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
814, at 229 (2d ed. 1982). To determine when the defendant's constitutional right to
a speedy trial has been denied, the Supreme Court has set forth four criteria a court
should consider: the "[l]ength of [the] delay, the reason[s] for the delay, the defen-
dant's assertion of his right" to a speedy trial, and any ensuing "prejudice to the de-
fendant" caused by the delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). If there
has been no Sixth Amendment violation, Rule 48(b) gives a court the discretion to
dismiss for unnecessary delay with or without prejudice. See United States v. Crow
Dog, 532 F.2d 1182,1194 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Starr, 434 F. Supp. 214,216
(D.D.C. 1977).
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 also codifies this power to dismiss with preju-
dice. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3156, 3161-3174 (1994). The Act requires a court to dismiss
the information or indictment on the defendant's motion if the defendant is not
brought to trial within the time limit required by the Act. See id. § 3162(a)(2). A
court must consider several factors in determining whether dismissal of the case is
with or without prejudice: "the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circum-
stances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on
the.., administration of justice." Id.
140. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982). Of course, the court ordinarily
retains the power to grant reasonable continuances in the interests of justice.
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in the future. For example, if the prosecution, although diligent,
cannot locate critical witnesses, it may reasonably request addi-
tional time to locate them.14 This is not to suggest that the prose-
cution can simply manufacture out of whole cloth a new version of
the case. Fairness to the defendant, professional responsibility
concerns, and the principle of judicial estoppel should prevent this
cavalier approach.
Of course, if the retrial is barred for reasons that relate to the
public's perception of the fairness of any verdict or to considera-
tions of fairness to the defendant, then the appropriate remedy
would be to enter the order with prejudice.
VI. A PROPOSED RULE GOVERNING RETRIALS FOLLOWING
SEVERAL HUNG JURIES
Although the courts possess the inherent power to prevent
reprosecutions after several hung juries,1 43 there are several rea-
sons that a rule should be adopted. First, an explicit rule would
dispel any question whether the court possesses inherent powers.
Second, in the federal system it would give the legislative branch
the opportunity to engage in the rulemaking process.1 " Third, it
would give the parties notice of the parameters governing attempts
to retry the defendant.
The following rule is proposed:
Proposed Rule: Power to Dismiss Prosecution
(a) On motion by the defendant or on its own motion, the
court may in the interests of justice and the effective ad-
ministration of the court's business dismiss an indictment,
information, or complaint, or part thereof, after one or
more trials that result in hung juries.
(b) In determining whether to dismiss a prosecution, or
141. But see Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 737-38 (1963) (prohibiting
retrial because of absence of prosecution witness).
142. One wonders whether the prosecution is restricted in presenting mutually
inconsistent positions in different trials of the same or different cases relating to the
same or related facts. See Jacobs v. Scott, 115 S. Ct. 711, 711-12 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
and Ginsberg, J., dissenting from denial of stay of execution); supra note 10. See also
1B MOORE, supra note 93, 0.405[8] (discussing the doctrine of judicial estoppel).
143. Congress possesses the ultimate authority to restrict or reject the power of
the court to bar reprosecutions after several hung juries unless the power is based
upon due process or other constitutional considerations. See supra note 14 (discus-
sing courts' inherent and supervisory powers).
144. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072,2074 (1994).
January 1997]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
part thereof, the court shall consider, among others, each
of the following factors:
1. the seriousness of the offense;
2. the facts and circumstances of the case that led to
the hung juries;
3. the impact of reprosecution on the rights of the
defendant; and
4. the impact of reprosecution or dismissal on the
administration of justice.
(c) Unless the court directs otherwise, the dismissal shall
be with prejudice. A dismissal over the objection of the
defendant shall be entered with prejudice.
(d) Any order of dismissal under this Rule shall be sup-
ported by findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(e) After the first hung jury the court may, and after suc-
cessive hung juries the court shall, enter an order setting
forth the court's understanding of the reasons for the
deadlock. To assist the court in determining whether to
dismiss a case, the court may question the jury.
VII. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of the double jeopardy or
other specific constitutional provisions, courts have the inherent
power to dismiss prosecutions after several hung juries. Rather
than relying on the amorphous power, however, it should be rec-
ognized through the rulemaking process, leaving the courts con-
siderable discretion in implementing it in specific cases. Whatever
else may be said, there does come a time when the impact of re-
peated trials on the defendant's rights and on the administration of
justice should cause the court to say, "Enough Is Enough."
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